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Use of DEA to Evaluate Non-linear and Imprecise Information in Construction 
Contractor Performance 
 
Gerald H. Williams, Jr.,  Timothy R. Anderson 
Department of Engineering Technology Management, Portland State University, USA 
 
Abstract- This paper explores the use of Data Envelopment 
Analysis as a tool to evaluate the efficiency of building 
construction projects in Oregon where the inputs, including, 
“reported information” available prior to pricing and 
contractor selection is imprecise or at least, cannot be entirely or 
accurately captured by exogenous measures.  This work builds 
on prior work in the field that evaluated missing, imprecise or 
non-existent information in DEA models and has broad 
application to the service sector of the economy where 
information is the prime input in the system.   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The generic economic production model used in the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology assumes a linear 
relationship between inputs and outputs even though we are 
unaware of precisely how those inputs are translated to 
outputs.  For example: if one were to use DEA to evaluate the 
efficiency of automobiles, the input might be gallons of 
gasoline and the output miles driven.  The most output for a 
fixed input or the least input for a fixed output would be a 
measure of automobile efficiency.  However, DEA 
researchers recognized a some time ago that not all 
automobiles are created equal and it is nonsensical to 
compare fuel efficiency of say an Austin Mini to Chevrolet 
Suburban; the auto’s have significantly different missions and 
what we may refer to as “economies of scale” or as Zhu [1] 
does, “Convexity.”  Banker formulated a variable returns to 
scale (VRS) method to accommodate the economies of scale 
problem [2].  The VRS model allows for economic 
comparisons among a relatively narrow range, however the 
basic assumption that underlies Banker’s formulation remains 
the linear relationship between inputs and outputs.   
While the VRS method would, most likely, exclude the 
comparison of the Mini to the Suburban, it almost certainly 
would not exclude the comparison of two Suburban’s with 
different amounts of inputs and outputs.  And if there was a 
distinctly non-linear relationship between the amount of gas 
input and say the number of passenger-miles output, this 
would merely show up as inefficiency in one of the two 
vehicles (or perhaps even the same vehicle on two separate 
trials.)   However, there may be a very good reason for the 
differences that are not based on “efficiency” but rather a 
non-linear relationship between inputs and outputs, in the 
example due to the different configurations of the 
automobile. 
There are a number of commercial institutions where the 
economic transactions can be characterized by non-linear 
relationships between inputs and outputs – in particular, those 
where there are limiting boundaries for either measure or 
endogenous effects that cannot be fully captured.  This is 
particularly true with professional services where input 
resources like “information,” and output measures “time” and 
“cost” have definite fixed boundaries.  An example that 
comes to mind almost immediately is weather prediction.  
Without virtually any information, it is easy to predict that 
the weather at any location on the planet by simply knowing 
the location and having some idea of the historical climate.  
For example, we can say that the temperature in Portland, 
Oregon tomorrow will range between 5º Fahrenheit and 105º 
F.  We can say this because no matter what the time of the 
year, because we know historical climate data, that the 
extreme temperatures ever recorded in Portland fall within 
these boundaries.  With little more information, like the day 
of the year requested, we can narrow that range significantly.  
But, no matter how much money we invest, we know that we 
cannot exactly predict the weather six months from now.  
Therefore there is a distinctly non-linear relationship between 
the amount of information paid for as an input, and the 
accuracy of the output prediction of temperature.   
The same relationship can be said to be true in the 
construction sector of the economy. Without almost no 
information, we know that the cost of construction is finite, 
and exists within some approximate range, say between $1 
and $5000 per square foot.  The amount of information 
collected by the owner and transmitted to the contractor, 
narrows the range of costs considerably, but simply cannot 
eliminate the variability or range entirely, in part because the 
building environment exists in “weather” that cannot be 
reliably predicted.  The question many owners want answered 
is, “how much information should I pay for in order to reduce 
the uncertainty in the pricing and how much information is 
simply a waste of resources, given the cost boundaries?”  
In the public sector of the construction industry in 
Oregon, owners have the opportunity to select and contract 
with contractors relying on less than complete construction 
documents, which is nearly unique among states in the US [3] 
[4].   Beginning in the 1980’s, public agencies in Oregon 
started to use alternative construction contractor selection 
methods to hire builders for public projects.  This process 
was authorized by law1 as early as 1977, but little used prior 
to the mid to late 1980’s, particularly in the building sector of 
the construction industry.  The common contractor selection 
method used since the public bidding laws were enacted in 
the 1930’s was by sealed competitive bid (commonly known 
as Design-Bid-Build, DBB or Lump Sum Bid, LSB method.)  
However, by the early 1980’s several public owners and 
construction contractors felt that the DBB method was a 
                                                 
1 See Oregon Revised Statues: ORS 279.015 (as amended) 
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principal factor in an ever increasing litigious market sector, 
delays in completion, increasing insurance rates and bond 
costs and overall lowering of the quality of work.  As a 
remedy, first the Port of Portland2 and next the Portland 
Development Commission3 authorized negotiated 
procurements on their respective construction projects (called 
CM/GC jobs for Construction Manager / General Contractor 
method.)  From the 1980’s to the year 2000, public agencies 
in Oregon have constructed more than five hundred public 
building projects that cost more than a million dollars 
($1,000,000) each4 and representing in excess of five billion  
dollars ($5,000,000,000) in tax expenditures.  At least one 
hundred thirty5 of those projects were negotiated 
procurements where contractor selection was based at least in 
part on prior performance of the firm (including overall 
project quality of performance metrics.)   While there have 
been some attempts to analyze or audit specific CM/GC 
projects6, there have been no prior attempts to evaluate a 
large set of these projects and compare their collective 
performance against the more widely used competitive bid 
project delivery system (PDS.) 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A. Information and Contractor Selection 
“Winner’s Curse” or adverse selection is widely studied 
in field of competitive economics and it is of particular 
concern in the public sector of the construction industry 
where most owners continue to use DBB as their primary 
PDS.  Kagel [5] and others have studied common value 
auctions and the winner’s curse in the construction industry 
and concluded that, while experienced construction bidders 
are subject to winners curse affects, the construction market 
attempts to correct for the curse by employing three 
strategies7: withdrawal of a low bid due to error, 
subcontractor buyout, and by overpricing change orders.  
Kagel also points out that there is a significant amount of 
“private information” in the bidding environment that is not 
accounted for by the plans and specifications, some of which 
                                                 
2 The first known competitive negotiation selection for a construction 
contractor was the then K-Wing of terminal south at the Portland 
International Airport.  It is not known why this project received an 
exemption from public bidding, no records of this project currently exist. 
3 The second known competitive negotiation selection for a construction 
contractor was for the Yamhill parking structure serving the Pioneer Place 
downtown development.  The process was justified in that project because 
the PDC had bad experiences in the past with projects that did not finish on 
time and the parking structure had to finish prior to the opening of the mixed 
use development for holiday season.  Increasing liquidated damages to cover 
the risk of developer lost profits was thought to be an uneconomical 
approach to ensuring the project opened on time. 
4 Our study focused on projects costing more than $5 million, but we did 
drop down to as low as $1 million in order to obtain as many negotiated 
projects as we could. 
5 There are 127 known negotiated procurements in the database, and another 
four dozen or more project that the selection method is not known (whether 
lump sum bid or negotiated procurement.) 
6 Oregon’s Secretary of State’s Audit Division, audited three major prison 
projects. 
7 Although not necessarily by these names. 
can be characterized as “experience” of the bidders and 
reliance on “rules-of-thumb” in bidding.  One strategy that 
Kagel omits however, which might just be the most 
important, is the bonding of subcontractor’s, which serves to 
almost entirely eliminate the general contractor’s greatest 
risk: the risk of a major subcontractor failing to perform on 
their contract.   
In Kagel’s brief review of the construction industry for 
his research, he concludes that contractor’s rely primarily on 
the plans and specifications as the primary information as a 
basis for their bid.  In fact, that proposition is solidly 
embedded in both Federal and Oregon Contract Law.8 
 
Information Model 
The amount of information available to a construction 
contractor at the time pricing or selection is required is never 
complete.  Figure 1 shows four assumed states of 
information: the lowest figure (arrow) represents all or 
“complete” information.  Clearly, this ideal is never achieved, 
as indicated in the second from bottom figure in the set.  This 
is the theoretical DBB competitive bid model of information 
upon which virtually all contracts and construction law are 
based.  It provides that the basis for all competitive contracts 
or scope of work for all competitive contracts is based solely 
on information provided by the Owner (typically by and 
through their consultant architects and engineers) and the 
State of Nature.  The State of Nature concept is based on an 
acceptable or typical performance of the States of Nature, 
usually meaning the “weather” but also includes such things 
as normally expected underground and hidden conditions.  
The amount of information regarding the State of Nature can 
be increased by expending time, effort and funds to make 
better predictions about the State of Nature, such as paying 
for the consultants to perform underground soils 
investigations.  But some States of Nature, in particular the 
weather, are outside the bounds of investigation, particularly 
on long term projects which are the subject of this study.  The 
standard in the construction industry is to use the “average” 
State of Nature as a benchmark for what the bidders should 
expect to encounter.  Only if the actual State of Nature of the 
weather is abnormally adverse, will there be an amendment to 
the Contract. 
The “Competitive Bid Contract Model” more accurately 
reflects the actual state of information in the competitive 
contract method, where the actual information provided at the 
time of pricing is less than Complete Information, by both the 
State of Nature and Errors and Omissions in the information 
provided by the Owner.  This leads to the contractual 
provisions in most construction contracts that allow for 
amendments to the Contract based on errors or omissions. 
 
                                                 
8 See In United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 39 S.Ct. 59, 63 L. Ed. 166 
(1918), and Oregon,  A.H. Barbour & Sons, Inc. v. State Highway 
Commission, 248 Or. 247, 433 P.2d 847 (1967); General Construction 
Company v. Oregon State Fish Commission, 26 Or. App. 577, 554 P2d 185 
(1976).   
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Figure 1: Various Construction Bidding Models 
 
The top figure in the Information model is the CM/GC 
model where the amount of information presented at the time 
of selection or pricing is admittedly less than complete than 
provided in the DBB model.  This model recognizes the 
construction contractor’s ability to exercise judgment and 
requires him to fill in the gaps between the amount of 
information given and what is required to derive a Contract 
price. 
 
B. DEA Methodology 
DEA is a widely studied methodology as demonstrated 
by Tavares [6] and Seiford [7].  For a complete discussion of 
the development of DEA and the different DEA Models the 
reader is referred to: [8], [9] and [1].  For the purposes of this 
paper, we present only a brief discussion to support our use of 
DEA in this research. 
DEA is a non-parametric, linear programming based 
method for evaluating relative efficiencies of Decision 
Making Units or DMUs.  DEA was originally devised by [10] 
as a method to derive relative efficiencies of different 
organizations or activities using multiple inputs and multiple 
outputs.  The focus on comparative efficiency using multiple 
inputs and outputs was, in part generated by the desire to 
measure factors other than financial performance such as 
sales and profitability.   
The linear programming method used in DEA evaluates 
a weighted sum of the various outputs divided by a weighted 
sum of the various inputs, in the model, while leaving the 
weighting scheme left up to the particular DMU, in order to 
maximize its DEA score.  This “Ratio Model” is expressed 
mathematically, in the form as: 
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In the model, the xij, yrj, are the known inputs and outputs 
of the jth DMU and the ur's and  vi's are the variable (or 
criteria) weights to be determined by the solution of the linear 
program9.  That is, DEA allows each DMU0 to pick the 
weighting scheme that maximizes its efficiency score relative 
to all other DMUs, subject to the constraint that any other 
DMU, with an identical weighting scheme, cannot achieve an 
efficiency score greater than 1.0.   The weighting scheme 
adopted by each individual DMU can be considered to reflect 
that specific DMU’s strategy for converting inputs into 
outputs.  For example a given DMU strategy may be to put 
all of its weight on one particular input and one particular 
output, and if that DMU has the highest ratio of these two 
metrics it will be deemed efficient. 
 
1. Current DEA Application Areas 
Seiford [7] and Tavares [6] have traced the evolution of 
DEA and provided a comprehensive bibliography of DEA 
papers that includes more than 1,500 and 3,200 references 
respectively.  DEA’s principal application has been to 
determine relative efficiencies using both financial and non-
financial performance measures.  The ability to include non-
financial performance measures has lead to initial 
applications in the Education, Government and Healthcare 
fields.  More recently, banking, warehousing, and the airline 
industries have also been major application areas where DEA 
has been used to combine both financial and non-financial 
performance measures.   
 
2. DEA in the Construction Industry 
The construction and building industry is often times 
called the single largest industry in the United States, and the 
largest single sector of the US economy representing between 
10 and 12% of GDP.  It would seem, given the industry size 
and impact on the economy, there would be plenty of 
Construction Industry applications of DEA; that is not 
however the case.  DEA applications in the construction 
industry have been limited to a few papers including: 
building sector research [11], road construction vehicle 
management [12, 13], and nuclear power plant construction 
times [14].    These applications have not directly involved a 
broad analysis of construction project management of major 
capital construction.   
Perhaps one of the reasons DEA has not been used to 
evaluate project management on major capital construction 
                                                 
9 Note that, as shown, the mathematical model is a non-linear formulation.  
Linearizing this formulation is discussed in the referenced DEA texts. 
Information provided by
the Owner
Information provided by the Owner STATE OFNATURE
STATE OF
NATURE
Information supplemented by
the Contractor
COMPLETE INFORMATION
ERROR
ERROR
Information provided by the Owner STATE OFNATURE
Theoretical Contract Model
Competitive Bid Contract Model
Negotiated Procurement Contract Model
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projects, or project management in general, is the problem of 
determining what inputs and outputs to use and how to 
measure them with any precision.  In order to deal with 
imprecise measures of inputs and outputs,  Cooper [15] and 
Zhu [16] have developed methods that use Ordinal and 
Categorical variables instead of direct measures.  In this 
research, the direct measures are known and quantifiable, but 
fail to capture all of the influences on inputs in the system.  
 
III. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
A. Type of Data Required 
The basic Construction Project model assumed for this 
research is shown in Figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Basic Construction Project Model 
 
The model dictates the type of data that needed to be 
obtained: inputs, consisting of the kind if information the 
contractor required for production and; outputs: measures of 
performance.  Measures of performance in “projects” 
generally, have been limited to measures of: Cost, Quality 
and Schedule performance.  On the input side, we needed to 
obtain data that characterized the type on information the 
contractor would need as a basis for the contract price (either 
a competitive lump sum or a negotiated guaranteed maximum 
price.)  Both the input and output metrics were determined by 
an Expert Panel of industry executives, representing 
Architects and Engineers, Contractors, and Owners. The 
Input and Output Metrics originally obtained included the 
following: Percentage Complete of the plans and 
specifications, Quality of the Plans, Owner’s prior experience 
in similar projects, Owner budget and schedule expectations, 
Contractor team experience, and Access to the site issues.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Original DEA Model from Expert Panel Work 
 
Figure 3, illustrates the initial DEA model that resulted 
from two rounds of surveys and discussions with the industry 
experts.  The Owner/Designer experience, Labor recruitment, 
budget expectations and Access to Site metrics were derived 
from subjective rankings based on a 1-5 scale.  As a proxy for 
Construction Team Experience, the construction team project 
manager’s experience in number of years of construction 
experience (at any professional level) was used.  
The percent complete of the “plans and specifications” 
was also something of a subjective measure because there is 
no exact definition or consistent measure of completeness 
used in the industry.  Architects, according to the Experts, 
typically consider their work as a process moving from: 
Conceptual Design to Schematic Design, to Design 
Development or Preliminary Design, then proceeding to Final 
Design and Working Drawings.  But, there is no consistent 
rule like 25% complete means “X” and 50% complete means 
“Y”.  However, the data collected did tend to fall into certain 
ranges of percent complete and were not categorically 
distributed10 as is evident from the histogram presented in 
Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 Histogram of %Complete Plans and Specifications 
 
This data and further discussions with Architects on the 
Expert Panel, would guide our parsing of the data into 
different catagories. 
 
1. Data Collection 
The collection of data for this research was a multi-phase 
process involving construction contractors, owners, 
architects, internet websites and the Portland and Seattle 
Daily Journal of Commerce (DJC) newspapers. Ultimately 
through all of the difference sources we were able to identify 
more than 500 public building projects, 407 of which 
generally fit into our research criteria.  Of the 407 projects we 
obtained some cost information on 367 projects, ranging in 
                                                 
10 By this we mean that all of the data does not fall into specific groupings 
like: 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% complete plans and specifications.  
However, in spite of the fact that the data does not fall into discrete 
categories, they do generally fall into consistent ranges, which we understand 
from our Expert Panel represents the different levels of design completeness. 
DEA ModelLabor Recruitment
Access to Site
% Complete Plans & Specification
# RFI’ s & APR’s
Budget Performance
Profit Performance
Schedule Performance
Safety Performance
# Punch List Items’ s
Finalizing Work
Contractor PM Experience
INPUTS: OUTPUTS:
Owner/Designer Experience
Owner Budget/Schedule Expectations
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cost11 from a $175,591 CM/GC fire station project to a 
$189,859,282, also CM/GC airport expansion project, in sum 
totaling $5,050,962,407 of public construction.     
A summary characterization of the projects by Project 
Delivery System is contained in Table1. 
 
 
TABLE 1 DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
Project Delivery 
System Type 
Number Smallest Largest Number with Unknown 
Financial Information 
CM/GC 136 $175,591 
1,400 SF 
$189,859,282 
1,000,000 SF 
8 with no $ data 
17 missing some $ data 
Design Bid Build 191 $663,325 
4,600 SF 
$112,497,017 
569,000 SF 
2 with no $ data 
89 missing some $ data 
Unknown 80 $223,166 
11,300 SF 
$35,211,963 
270,000 SF 
2 with no $ data 
78 missing some $ data  
Total 407    
 
11Of these 407 projects we were only able to obtain 
enough data on 218 jobs that allowed us to use them in our 
DEA model12.  A total of 71 Construction Contractors13 and 
70 Architecture firms14 are represented in the project 
database, ranking from the largest firms in their respective 
sectors in Oregon, to small, even single practitioner offices. 
 
2. Analysis of the Data 
The first analysis performed on the data obtained for this 
research was to evaluate the population using standard 
statistical methods.  Figure 5 is a single frequency histogram 
of the output metric Budget Performance, which we defined 
above as the total final cost divided by the initial bid or 
contract guaranteed maximum price.  Note the average 
Budget Performance is 0.947, with a standard deviation of 
0.07.  The figure indicates that the data is generally well 
distributed with one sole outlier at the extreme left hand side 
of the figure.   
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Figure 5: Budget Performance Metric Histogram 
                                                 
11 These costs are adjusted to 2001 using Engineering News Record’s 
Construction Cost Index obtained from their website at: 
http://enr.construction.com/features/conEco/costIndexes/constIndexHist.asp . 
12 Some of these would be eliminated during the model validation phase 
13 This number includes two Joint Ventures as separate companies from their 
parents. 
14 Note that some firms have changed names over the years; we have 
attempted to count a firm only once if it added or lost partners along the way.  
However, Joint Venture firms were counted separately from their parent 
organizations consistent with our treatment with contractors. 
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Figure 6: Schedule Performance Metric Histogram 
 
Figure 6 is a single frequency histogram of the Schedule 
Performance metric, which indicates a much broader 
distribution than the Budget Performance metric.  This stands 
to reason because time is a more available resource than 
money in most situations and exceeding planned performance 
time is more likely and less costly than exceeding the project 
financial resources.  It’s far more likely to allow a project to 
run longer by 100% of the original schedule, resulting in a 
Schedule Performance Metric of 0.50, than increase by 
double the cost.  An increase in total cost of double would in 
fact only occur in projects that undergo a “Cardinal Change” 
and therefore, by definition, the original contract value is 
irrelevant because it does not reflect the intent of the 
contracting parties.   
 
3. Population Independence 
The principle purpose of this research was to determine 
if the different project delivery systems resulted in better 
projects based on certain output metrics as determined by the 
Expert Panel. 
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TABLE 2 GROUP STATISTICS15 
Group Statistics
101 .93817 .076605 .007622
112 .95411 .071808 .006785
97 .94000 .129317 .013130
102 .93098 .132108 .013081
PDS
1
2
1
2
BUD_PRFD
SCH_D
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
 
Table 2 presents the Group Statistics for the two 
principal populations: DBB (#1) and CM/GC (#2.)  What this 
analysis tells us is that, while there are differences in the 
population, they are slight and not statistically significant.  
The important thing to note here is how little variance there is 
in the principal output metrics.  Another way to look at this 
data is given in the two-dimensional plot given in Figure 7 . 
 
Figure 7 - Two Dimensional Plot of the Output Metrics 
 
If there were no inputs, and these were the only outputs, 
then the envelopment of this data, shown as a dashed line 
above, would give us the technical efficiencies of the 
projects.  From the plot, it appears that the minimum 
efficiency would be in the range of 0.70 or 70%.  Again 
however, the important thing to note is that the data is not 
broadly distributed but instead, it is rather tightly grouped 
around the 1.0, 1.0 intersection.  In fact, only just slightly 
more than 13% (29/218) of the projects with non-zero data 
points, fall outside of plus or minus 20% of the 1.0 measure 
in either direction.  If this were the envelopment data, it 
appears that just three projects would form the efficiency 
frontier, but we do have inputs and other outputs for this data 
set. 15 
 
                                                 
15 The reader will note that the number of cases are not the same for each 
Metric, this is due to the fact that some information is missing in some of the 
cases and zero’s have been omitted from this statistical analysis.  In the case 
of the DEA analysis that follows, zero’s are included in the output measure. 
4. DEA Model Analysis 
Figure 7 presents a good representation of project 
outcomes if inputs are not considered.  Our research was 
intended to consider both inputs and outputs.  However, the 
important thing to note from Figure 7, and from out statistical 
analysis presented above, is that the project outputs are not 
dramatically dissimilar.  In fact, while there is quite a range 
of outputs, particularly in the schedule performance metric, 
the vast majority of the projects had performance outputs that 
were substantially similar, with few truly outstanding and few 
truly horrible projects.  Even those projects that did poorly on 
one of the two metrics, appear to have made up for it in the 
other.  And, the reason the project performance results 
presented in Figure 7 are important, is because it directly 
impacts how the DEA analysis would be performed. 
 
B. Initial DEA Model Analysis (CRS and VRS Models) 
The normal method for evaluating DMUs in DEA is by 
application of either a Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) 
model or a Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) model.  These 
models have been used throughout the literature and applied 
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in a number of different industries and economic sectors.  
However, neither the traditional CRS or VRS models is well 
suited to the evaluation of the data set in this research.  This 
is because of the peculiar fact that the inputs vary so 
substantially but the outputs do not.  Traditionally, when a 
researcher wanted to evaluate a data set of DMUs with 
extreme differences in input and output metric values; such as 
comparing grocery stores and including mini-marts, 
traditional mainstream stores, and warehouse stores in the 
same data set, the researcher would apply a VRS model.    
VRS DEA Scores
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Figure 8 VRS DEA Scores - Base Model Ranked by Efficiency Score High to Low 
 
Running the VRS Model results in only 130 of 215 total 
projects with greater than 50% efficiency scores and 48 of 
215 with better than 90% efficiency score.  These results do 
not correspond to either the results of the statistical analysis 
(Table 2 above) or the output plot (Figure 7) nor do they 
match the perception of the Expert Panel Members who 
uniformly maintained that, except in rare cases, projects 
should fall within a narrow range of results.   
It is probably intuitive, but the results of a CRS model 
are even worse than the VRS model.  The CRS model 
resulted in only 16 of 215 projects with efficiency scores 
above 90% and only 87 of 215 with scores better than 50%.  
It should be obvious from these results that the application of 
either a CRS or VRS model without significant modification 
does not shed any light on the analysis of this construction 
project data.    
 
C. Modifying the DEA Model for Construction Project Data 
It’s really fairly obvious why the VRS and CRS models 
result in the distribution of scores as they do, since the 
outputs lay within a rather narrow range and the inputs vary 
from 0.25 to 1.0 (or 25% to 100% complete plans and 
specifications.)   Nearly all of the projects with plans and 
specifications of 100% complete will have efficiency scores 
below 50% - which is exactly what happens.  The problem 
comes in the evaluation of those input metrics.  Recall that 
above we stated that there is no fixed standard for evaluating 
percentage complete, and the method we used was simply to 
ask the various parties to assign a number based on their past 
experience,16 this results in extreme non-linear relationships 
between the principal inputs and outputs.  While there is 
basic agreement that “conceptual design” is less complete in 
terms of “% complete plans and specifications” metric than 
“schematic design” or “preliminary design” the precise 
estimates of the values varies.  In other words, one project 
managers 25% complete may be another’s 35 or 40% 
complete.   
In situations where the inputs and outputs are not directly 
linearly related and the exact relationship is unknown or not 
captured by known inputs, a possible approach would be to 
apply a “categorical” variable model.  In that case the 
“conceptual design” complete projects do not compete 
directly with the “final design” complete jobs, but rather they 
compete among each other within categories.  However, that 
                                                 
16 Note also that 100% complete was the default if no other information was 
given. 
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would render meaningless the point of this research, which is 
in part, to compare the PDS by outcome, against one another 
and determine if one type is significantly superior to the 
other. 
It is important to note also, that the analysis set forth in  
Table 2 and described in Figure 7 support Kagel’s point [5], 
and our conclusion that the amount of actual “Information” 
provided is not captured by the metric “% complete plans and 
specifications” in spite of the fact that the Expert Panel 
recommended.  This is because the metric fails to take into 
account the economic reality of the industry and the amount 
of training and experience of the estimators and managers of 
the construction companies involved, which is substantial17.  
This is perhaps better visualized in the Process Model 
suggested by Figure 9. 
 
Contractor
Knowledge &
Experience
Owner Provided
Information - Inputs DEA Model Input DEA Model Output
DEA
Model
 
Figure 9 Process Model 
 
We know, both from our own study and from industry 
standards that the cost of public buildings of virtually all 
types resides within a relatively small range.  For example, 
RS Means Building Construction Cost Data, estimating guide 
provides a section that provides per square foot cost estimates 
for approximately sixty different type buildings from 
Apartments to Warehouses.  This data includes estimates at 
the 25 percentile, Median, and 75 percentile ranges.  
Furthermore, while these data are determined by national 
averages, the guide also provides regional indexes to convert 
the average costs to a cost for a specific area.  Portland, 
Oregon for example has a weighted average of about 1.06 
times the national cost average for buildings, according to 
Means.17 
Armed with a commonly available estimating guide and 
experience in the local construction market, it is possible, 
easy in fact, for a construction estimator to narrow the range 
of possible costs far tighter than an input of 25% to 100% 
would imply.  So, for the purposes of a DEA model, is it 
possible to account for this base of knowledge that is an 
additional “resource” (or enhances the Information provided 
resource) that results in “production” from the model?  And 
the answer to that question is, probably, but probably not to a 
level of certainty that makes the evaluation meaningful.  
Also, while we did collect data on the different construction 
companies, none of the data we collected as a proxy for 
experience (including number of years in business, bonding 
capacity, project team experience and so on) could be reliably 
tied to a single input metric for “knowledge” that would 
differ significantly from company to company.  This again, 
would make the input meaningless (if for example, all the 
companies had the same input value.)  
The decision was made to apply a modified categorical 
model using successive data sets that included: 1) all project 
                                                 
17 One reason for limiting the projects to a certain size, larger than $5 
million, was because we knew that only construction firms with substantial 
resources and experience can qualify for Miller Act, performance and 
payment bonds, for that size of work. 
data; 2) only projects with higher than 40% complete plans 
and specifications; 3) only projects with higher than 75% 
complete plans and specifications; and finally, 4) only 
projects with higher than 95% plans and specifications (in 
other words only those that had the design complete.)   
Mathematically this revision to the basic DEA formulation in 
vector form looks like: 
 
Min: θ 
Subject to: Yλ ≥ Y0 
  Xλ ≤ θX0 
  λ ≥ 0 
λi = 0 i∀  such that Ci < C0 
 
Define Ci = 1: Conceptual Design: <50% Complete 
 2: Schematic Design: 50% to 75% Complete 
 3: Preliminary Design: 75% to 95% Complete 
 4: Final Design: 95% to 100% Complete 
  
The controlling direction of the analysis was guided by 
state statute.  In Oregon, as nearly every other state, on public 
building projects, the state gives the priority to open public 
bidding and discourages closed negotiated procurements 
except when it can be shown to be a substantial benefit to the 
public.  The relevant portions of the particular Oregon statute, 
ORS 270.015 is as follows:  
279.015 Competitive bidding; exceptions; exemptions. 
(1) Subject to the policies and provisions of ORS 
279.005 and 279.007, all public contracts shall be based 
upon competitive bids or proposals except: 
 
(2) Subject to subsection (6)(b) of this section, the 
Director of the Oregon Department of Administrative 
Services or a local contract review board may exempt 
certain public contracts or classes of public contracts 
from the competitive bidding requirements of subsection 
(1) of this section upon approval of the following 
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findings submitted by the public contracting agency 
seeking the exemption: 
 
(b) The awarding of public contracts pursuant to the 
exemption will result in substantial cost savings to the 
public contracting agency. In making such finding, the 
director or board may consider the type, cost, amount of 
the contract, number of persons available to bid and such 
other factors as may be deemed appropriate. 
 
(3)(a) Before final adoption of the findings required by 
subsection (2) of this section exempting a contract for a 
public improvement from the requirement of competitive 
bidding, a public agency shall hold a public hearing. 
 
It is clear from these sections of the statute that the 
Oregon Legislature intended to make the option of exempting 
from bidding and negotiating public building contracts a 
difficult and well reasoned alternative to open competitive 
public bidding, but certainly an option.  Since the state has 
established the baseline PDS to be DBB, then the negotiated 
procurements, the CM/GC projects, must be considered the 
“challenger.”  Therefore, the challenger, which is disfavored 
in the statute, has the burden to show it is superior against the 
baseline, whereas the baseline has no such burden18.  It is 
reasonable to argue that this being the case, there is no need 
to evaluate the different levels of information in terms of the 
Percent Complete metric, rather, simply run all CM/GC jobs 
categorically against all competitors, and then run only the 
DBB projects to establish their efficiency scores.  While this 
obviously can be done, we wanted a finer break-out from the 
analysis. 
 
D. Results from the Modified DEA Model 
We did not recode the existing computer software 
instead the Modified DEA Model was run using EMS® 
Software from project data stored in an Excel® spreadsheet.  
Four passes were made on the data each using a CCR, Input 
Oriented Model19.  The first pass included all data in the 
project database but was only used to calculate the DEA 
scores of the projects with less than 50% plans and 
specifications.  The second pass included all the data for 
projects with plans and specifications more than 50% 
complete, but again was used only to calculate the DEA 
scores for projects with plans and specifications between 50% 
and 75% complete.  The third pass included all projects with 
plans and specifications more than 75% complete and was 
used to calculate the DEA efficiency scores for projects with 
plans and specifications between 75% and 95% complete.  
Finally, the fourth pass included only projects with plans and 
specifications more than 95% complete and was used to 
calculate these project’s DEA efficiency scores.  
The results of this process is depicted in Table 10 below: 
Modified Model Efficiency Scores
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Figure 10 Modified Model Efficiency Scores1819 
                                                 
18 This argument is drawn directly from the plain language wording of §2(B) of ORS 279.015 
19 All of these passes were made without regard to the quality of the information metric SF/(RFI+AR) 
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The DEA efficiency scores from the Modified Model, 
range from approximately 67% to 100% and have an 
arithmetic mean of 91.52%20, as presented in Table 3 below.  
Also shown is a single frequency histogram of the DEA 
efficiency scores from the Modified Model, presented in 
Figure 11.  
 
TABLE 3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEA SCORES FROM 
MODIFIED MODEL 
Descriptive Statistics
215 67% 100% 91.52% 7.759%
215
SCORE
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
 
SCORE
100.0
98.0
96.0
94.0
92.0
90.0
88.0
86.0
84.0
82.0
80.0
78.0
76.0
74.0
72.0
70.0
68.0
66.0
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Std. Dev = 7.76  
Mean = 91.5
N = 215.00
 
Figure 11 Histogram of all DEA efficiency Scores from the Modified Model 
 
The results obtained by the Modified Model are more 
consistent with the Expert Panel’s intuitive understanding of 
construction project performance than the results obtained in 
the earlier DEA models depicted in Figure 8.   Fifty-seven of 
the 215 projects in the final data set were determined to be 
100% efficient, and 140 projects scored 90% or higher.    
 
E. Evaluating the Project Delivery Systems 
The next step in our analysis was to evaluate the two 
project delivery systems, DBB (Design Bid Build or Lump 
Sum Bid) and CM/GC (Construction Management/General 
Contractor the Negotiated Procurement method.)   This was 
done by applying normal statistical methods, reserving of 
course, the same caveats about statistical analysis of DEA 
score distributions that was previously discussed.  Both the 
group statistics and the tests for independence are presented 
in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively21.  
 
 
TABLE 4 GROUP STATISTICS OF DEA SCORES FROM THE 
MODIFIED MODEL 
Group Statistics
111 92.50% 8.592% .815%
104 90.48% 6.643% .651%
TYPE
C
L
SCORE
N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
 
 
TABLE 5 TEST FOR INDEPENDENT POPULATIONS FOR PDS BASED ON DEA SCORES FROM THE MODIFIED MODEL 
Independent Samples Test
9.897 .002 1.921 213 .056 2.02% 1.052% -.052% 4.096%
1.937 205.718 .054 2.02% 1.044% -.036% 4.080%
Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
SCORE
F Sig.
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
 
The statistical analysis of the DEA scores gives similar 
results as that produced on the base output data analysis 
presented in Table 2.  That is, in spite of the fact the CM/GC 
negotiated procurements have a slightly higher average there 
is no statistically significant difference between the two PDS 
groups in terms of DEA scores from the Modified Model.  
2021 
                                                 
20 DEA scores are known to be non-normally distributed however both the 
arithmetic mean and the standard deviation do provide us with valuable 
information about the distribution of the DEA data.  
21 Note in Table 4, “C” is used for CM/GC projects and “L” us used for 
Lump Sum Bid jobs. 
 
Since DEA is a non-parametric method and the DEA 
scores are distinctly not normally distributed, another way of 
evaluating any difference in the two populations is to actually 
look at the distributions and apply non-parametric techniques.  
Observing these two populations we note that the CM/GC 
projects have a higher proportion of 100% efficient projects 
than do the DBB jobs.  In fact, 41 of 111 CM/GC projects 
were determined to be 100% efficient, whereas only 15 of the 
104 DBB jobs were determined to be 100% efficient.  
However this difference becomes less distinct when you 
compare all projects with 90% or better efficiency scores; in 
that case, 64 of the 104 DBB jobs scored better than 90% 
efficient, while 74 of the 111 CM/GC projects scored 90% or 
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better.  And, on the other end of the spectrum, six of the 111 
CM/GC projects scored less than 75% efficient, whereas only 
one of the DBB jobs scored lower than 75%. 
 
IV. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
 
A. Summary of Analysis 
This research sets forth a method to deal with data that is 
both imprecise but known to exist within certain limits and is 
non-linearly related to output performance in the Data 
Envelopment Method model.  The research uses input 
information metrics to evaluate the performance of 
construction projects based on two different project delivery 
methods: Design Bid Build, the common method of open 
competitive lump sum low bid selection; and Construction 
Manager/General Contractor, a negotiated public construction 
procurement method used extensively in Oregon since 1986. 
In order to compare the two methods the data was broken 
up into different input categories basically reflecting the 
different stages of design: Conceptual Design, Schematic 
Design, Preliminary Design, and Final Design, while keeping 
the precise estimates provide in the data set from the different 
data sources (Construction Contractor, Architect, and Owner, 
project management personnel assigned to the specific jobs.)  
Since public policy in Oregon favors open competitive lump 
sum bidding, the CM/GC projects were used as 
“Challengers” and competed against the bid projects to 
determine their DEA scores, whereas the bid projects 
generally competed against only other bid jobs.   
The results of this research show that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the procurement 
methods based on an analysis of either the raw output metrics 
or the DEA efficiency scores from our Modified Model.  
However, analysis of the populations does indicate that the 
CM/GC projects have both a higher likelihood of being 100% 
efficient than the DBB projects, and a higher likelihood of 
being below 75% efficient than the DBB projects.  Both 
methods appear to produce about the same proportion of 
projects in the 90% or better range, which is probably 
“acceptable” for public construction projects. 
 
B. Conclusions 
In a certain limited number of instances, the input 
metrics for a DEA model are not capable of properly 
capturing the total amount of resources available to produce 
performance outputs because they are either: unknown, not 
precisely measurable or highly non-linear, in terms of inputs 
to outputs.  This is the case in the public construction 
contracting sector of the economy, where the inputs include 
not only what the Contractor is given by the Owner in terms 
of plans and specifications in order to determine a price, but 
also must include his knowledge and experience both in the 
type of work and the local market.  And while it’s probably 
true that the more experienced contractors with greater the 
knowledge are probably better able to convert information 
provided by the Owner into inputs for the DEA Construction 
Project model, that process is neither well understood nor 
easily measured.  Therefore a modified categorical variable 
approach was developed and used to overcome these 
shortcomings. 
The principal conclusion that we draw from this research 
is that there is no significant difference between the two 
project delivery systems either in terms of their DEA scores 
or the statistical analysis of the raw output metrics for 
schedule and budget performance.  Since the public policy of 
the State of Oregon asserts a preference for competitive open 
public bidding except in specific cases provided for under the 
exemption clause, namely a significant financial benefit to 
the public, this research under those conditions does not 
support the use of negotiated public procurements.  However, 
it is not so much our view that the negotiated procurement 
method is bad, but rather that the policy is wrong.  In fact, it 
is probably best to look at our analysis from the reverse side 
of the public policy, that is: since there is no significant 
difference between the two populations, the public pays no 
additional price for using the negotiated procurement method 
instead of the competitive open public bid method.  That 
conclusion recommends a reexamination of the public policy 
exemption criteria, which most certainly needs to be changed. 
 
C. Future Work 
This research is neither the final word on this DEA 
application nor the public policy debate regarding the 
procurement of construction services for public projects.  
Clearly there is a need to better understand the process by 
which certain types of information are converted into inputs 
for DEA models in order to apply DEA to a broader set of 
service sector applications.  The process construction 
contractor’s undergo is similar to the process that any 
professional consultant undergoes in order to produce a 
product or outcome for an owner.   Whether that person is an 
Accountant, Architect or Engineer, all are given a varying 
amount of information from their client, which they convert 
into useful inputs through some “process model” and 
eventually into outputs.  The same perhaps can be said of 
physicians treating patients.  Absent that understanding, the 
linkage between the information and the outputs in the DEA 
model, are far to non-linear to produce acceptable and 
reasonable results using DEA. 
As for the policy debate regarding construction 
contracting project delivery methods, it is clear from our 
research that the legislature has to come to grips with the fact 
that the current policy is simply unworkable since it cannot 
be supported by either empirical or theoretical data analysis.  
The focus of this effort should be in better aligning the policy 
goals with the benefits that can be achieved by the different 
methods.  The fact that the public pays no additional cost for 
starting a project at the conceptual or preliminary design 
phases is a clear indication of the advantages presented by the 
method that is totally ignored in the policy statement. 
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